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Gender balance in decision-making
A B S T R A C T
Irrigation has been promoted as a strategy to reduce poverty and improve livelihoods in southern Africa.
Households’ livelihood strategies within small-scale irrigation schemes have become increasingly complex and
diversified. Strategies consist of farm income from rain-fed and irrigated cropping as well as livestock and an
increasing dependence on off-farm income. The success of these strategies depends on the household’s ability to
make decisions about how to utilize its’ financial, labour, land and water resources. This study explores the
dynamics of decision-making in households on-farm household income within six small-scale irrigation schemes,
across three southern African countries. Household survey data (n= 402) was analyzed using ordered probit and
ordinary least squares regression. Focus group discussions and field observations provided qualitative data on
decision-making in the six schemes. We found strong support for the notion that decision-making dynamics
strongly influence total household income. Households make trade-offs between irrigation, dryland, livestock
and off-farm work when they allocate their labour resources to maximize household income; as opposed to
maximizing the income from any individual component of their livelihood strategy, such as irrigation. Combined
with the impact of the small plot size of irrigated land, this is likely to result in sub-optimal benefits from
expensive investments in irrigation infrastructure. Policy-makers must consider this when developing and im-
plementing new policies.
1. Introduction
Increasing the productivity and profitability of small-scale irrigation
systems in developing countries is critical to improve food security and
well-being of small-scale irrigators and their communities. In the past
few decades in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), agriculture has been a con-
tributor to reducing poverty (Davis et al., 2017). In rural areas, liveli-
hood diversification is increasingly dependent on off-farm activities,
and has been associated with increased household income and poverty
alleviation (Davis et al., 2017; Ellis, 2000; Ellis and Allison, 2004;
Manero, 2016).
Farming households and their decision-making are central to the
development challenge of alleviating rural poverty in developing
countries (Booysen et al., 2013). On a daily basis, households have to
make decisions about the allocation of their labour, land, water and
capital resources between the different income earning activities.
Decisions are often taken by different household members, who may
not all be present on-farm. Decisions might be sub-optimal for a par-
ticular income earning activity, and therefore for the family member
undertaking it, but optimal for overall household well-being. Income
diversification and the balance of decision-making across household
members constitute what we define as the “dynamics of household
decision-making”.
Within small-scale irrigation schemes, income diversification in-
cludes rain-fed cropping, irrigation, livestock, and off-farm1 activities.
Off-farm activities vary from being seasonal to a degree of permanency
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(Ellis and Allison, 2004). Consequently, many men between the ages of
30–60 are absent from irrigation schemes (Cousins, 2013), and women
(approximately 50% of the agricultural labour force) are often the
principal farmers (Bryceson, 2002; Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, 2011a). Women’s involvement in decision-
making for various farm and household activities has been studied in
the context of property ownership; gendered management systems;
innovation and food security; women’s empowerment; and landscape
management (Doss et al., 2014; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2012; Mutenje
et al., 2016; Peterman et al., 2015; Pierce Colfer et al., 2015).
Whilst different crops have been considered in these studies, there is
no explicit differentiation between irrigated and rainfed production and
whether the decision-making dynamics are associated with irrigation
households. There is also a gap in how this dynamic influences overall
household income, and the differing roles of female decision-making in
irrigation schemes in Africa.
This paper fills this gap using on-farm surveys from six small-scale
irrigation schemes in southern Africa, and addresses three research
questions: i) are traditional decision-making norms reflected in con-
temporary irrigator households in southern Africa; ii) what influences
the gender balance of household decision-making; and iii) how do de-
cision-making dynamics influence household income? This knowledge
is important, especially as irrigation is presented as one way to improve
livelihoods and economic development in rural Africa (Xie et al., 2014).
Participation in decision-making (both intra-household and within ir-
rigation communities and management) is associated with access to
knowledge and empowerment, and has the potential to change gender
norms (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011; Stern et al., 2016; van Koppen and
Hussain, 2007).
The paper first discusses the literature on livelihood strategies and
farm household decision-making dynamics. Section three provides
background on the six irrigation schemes (location and demographics);
and outlines the collection of data using household surveys and focus
group discussions, the construction of a decision index, and the mod-
elling of influences. Section four presents the results and discusses: 1)
the overall decision-making index for each country and for four pro-
duction types (rainfed, irrigated crops, cattle, small stock); 2) the in-
fluences on the decision-making index (overall and by production type);
3) the influence of the decision-making index on income; and 4) in-
sights from the focus group discussions.
2. Livelihood strategies and the decision-making dynamics of
farm households
2.1. Livelihood strategies and income diversification
Household income diversification is widespread—regardless of lo-
cation, farm size or wealth (Bryceson, 2002; Ellis, 2000). In contrast to
other regions, the largest share of household income in Africa is derived
from agriculture: approximately two-thirds for 92% of households
(Davis et al., 2017). Off-farm income represents about one third of
earnings for 70% of SSA households, with few households relying on
remittances (Davis et al., 2017). In particular, off-farm income is ben-
eficial for reducing reliance on natural resources and alleviating pov-
erty, and increasingly important for driving growth in yields (Ellis and
Allison, 2004; Proctor and Lucchesi, 2012). Whilst agricultural income
is the dominant regional income source, the proportion varies sig-
nificantly across countries and irrigation schemes. For example, agri-
cultural income accounted for 73%, 49% and 27% of household income
within six schemes in Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, respec-
tively (Manero, 2016). On the other hand, a study of smallholders in
KwaZulu-Natal found farming contributed to 14% of household income
(Sinyolo et al., 2016). Findings by Manero (2016) suggested that agri-
culture-only households have lower incomes, with comparatively
higher income households better able to diversify into off-farm income
earning activities (Ellis and Allison, 2004).
As more household members take up off-farm activities, the tradi-
tional divisions of labour, economic rights and roles dissolve (Bryceson,
2002). For example, young people have mixed livelihoods that include
off-farm work, with a greater proportion of 15–24 year olds working
off-farm compared to other age groups (Zuo et al., 2018). Additionally,
whilst it has been argued that off-farm work is more prevalent for men,
a recent study shows similar proportions of young men and women
working off-farm (Bryceson, 2002; Zuo et al., 2018). The out-migration
of males and feminization of agriculture in SSA, has resulted in in-
creased roles and responsibilities for women (Bryceson, 2002; Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2011b; Lastarria-
Cornhiel, 2006). Despite this change, women left on the farm may have
little decision-making power (Ellis and Allison, 2004); however, this
may be connected to their reluctance to report their decision-making
power and also whether they are de facto or de jure households
(Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2006).
2.2. Patterns in management and decision-making
The household is the basic unit of production and makes many
critical farming decisions (de Sherbinin et al., 2008). Unitary and col-
lective models are used in farming household research: however, both
approaches oversimplify the complexity of households’ decision-
making. The former assumes that the household represents others’
opinions and overlooks gender and age differences that can create di-
vergent preferences and power asymmetries (de Sherbinin et al., 2008;
van Koppen and Hussain, 2007; Hussain, 2007).
This study draws predominantly on the collective model where it is
assumed that decision-making takes place between two separate in-
dividuals, commonly a husband and a wife, but also involves other
household members. This model allows consideration of both co-
operative and non-cooperative bargaining; which together offer several
useful characterizations of intra-household decision-making.
Independent action by spouses may or may not be Pareto efficient;
where individuals have different preferences and bargaining power.
Those with more bargaining power will have more control over assets
and decision-making; which may change over time (Anderson et al.,
2017; Doss and Meinzen-Dick, 2015).
In a non-farm context in South Africa, Booysen et al. (2013) find a
mix of decision-making models depending on household characteristics.
Collective was more likely in large households; a unitary and non-co-
operative model was more likely in female-headed households; a col-
lective and joint model was more likely where household heads were
older; and bargaining was more cooperative where household heads
were more educated. This variation in decision-making models poten-
tially also applies in rural settings. Other studies have explored the
impacts of information on multiple household members, how they work
collectively to meet their needs, and the role of social context (norms
and rules) in multiple domains (household, community, state and
market) (Lambrecht, 2017).
Household head categorization is also important for policy
(Quisumbing et al., 2014). The most frequent categorization is whether
households are male- or female-headed (Shaner et al., 1982).
Disaggregating female-headed households into de jure and de facto
provides increased understanding of how these households differ in
relation to endowments and structural constraints (de la O Campos
et al., 2016). De-jure female-headed households are often the poorest
and most disadvantaged (Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, 2011b).
Based on who has the greatest level of farm managerial control (in
relation to investments, production subunits, labour allocation and
profit), categorizations include male-managed; female-managed; sepa-
rately managed; and jointly managed. All four systems exist in Africa.
However, within SSA, male-managed systems dominate and jointly
managed systems are less prevalent compared to Asia and Latin
America (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2012). Female-headed households
H. Bjornlund et al. Agricultural Water Management 213 (2019) 135–145
136
comprise approximately 25% in SSA with the proportion varying across
countries: for example, 26% in Mozambique, 43% in Zimbabwe and
25% in Tanzania (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, 2011a,b).
‘Jointness’ is frequently used in the literature as an indicator of
gender equality. Ideally, if assets are owned jointly by men and women
and decisions are made jointly, then there is likely to be less gender
inequality. However, establishing the jointness of decision-making is
complex: people tend to select ‘joint’ with further discussions revealing
that one person makes most of the decisions (Meinzen-Dick et al.,
2012); and jointness can represent conflict as well as cooperation (Njuki
et al., 2014). Input into decision-making may be a more valuable in-
dicator of empowerment, with women valuing substantial input and
consensus more highly (Doss et al., 2014). In households where women
are more educated and less involved in field work, there is a higher
degree of consensus about which spouse has decision-making authority
(Anderson et al., 2017).
2.3. Influences on household decision-making
The literature identifies a range of socioeconomic influences on
decision-making, including: age; marital status; children; education;
farming experience; time spent on farm; economic contribution; atti-
tude; ownership of assets; income; farm size; family structure; networks
(Doss et al., 2014; Doss and Meinzen-Dick, 2015; Mutenje et al., 2016);
remittances; agricultural terms of trade (Matshe and Young, 2004);
extension availability/quality (Wheeler et al., 2017); and health and
practical mobility (Anderson et al., 2017; Djurfeldt et al., 2018). This
list reflects a range of livelihood capitals (Ellis, 2000) and underscores
the highly heterogeneous nature of farming households and the com-
plexity of influences on decision-making.
Control of household assets, particularly land, has a significant in-
fluence on decision-making. It is critical for a woman’s bargaining
power and for improved outcomes in agricultural households (Doss and
Meinzen-Dick, 2015; Quisumbing, 2010). In Africa, although men own
the majority of individually owned assets there is also a significant
amount of joint land ownership (Johnson et al., 2016). The latter po-
sitively influences female participation in farm decision-making, and
the relationship is stronger where there is sole female ownership (Doss
et al., 2014). However, there is stronger evidence of increased female
participation in decision-making rather than female influence on deci-
sion-making outcomes (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011).
More specifically, it has been found that women in Malawi with a
higher decision-making power index—based on level of involvement in
key farm decisions, marketing and household expenditure—had a
greater influence on farming practice selection (Mutenje et al., 2013).
Female participation in decision-making was positively influenced by
education (both female and male), marital status and skills training, but
negatively influenced by religion and informal networks.
The gender balance of decision-making is influenced by changing
patterns of farm management through urbanization, increased out-mi-
gration and mixing of groups with different norms (Njuki et al., 2014).
As a result, gender divisions in labour and decision-making have been
described as ‘eroding’ and ‘less rigid’ (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2012; Peters,
1986). In particular, the social norms that influence land access and
decision-making are ‘dynamic and evolving’ as markets and the value of
inputs change (Lambrecht, 2017).
2.4. Division of labour and its influence on household decision-making
Traditionally, many work patterns have been entrenched along
gender lines in African agriculture: for example, men care for cattle and
work the land while women undertake other arable tasks, care for small
livestock and dairy cattle, and perform household activities (Peters,
1986). The inclusion of dairy cattle reflects that women look after li-
vestock housed and fed around the home (Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, 2011b). In SSA, women have re-
sponsibility for food crops; while men have primary responsibility for
cash crops with women providing the labour (Mehra and Esim, 1997).
A Tanzanian study found that men prefer to irrigate high-value crops
that can be harvested in bulk and sold in larger volumes. Whereas,
women prefer crops that can be harvested in smaller quantities over a
longer period for home consumption or selling locally for regular in-
come (Njuki et al., 2014). Another Tanzanian study found that women
had higher input into minor household expenditure, food production
and cash crops, and the lowest input into major household expenditure
(Doss et al., 2014).
Overall, we concur with McGregor et al. (2001) that drawing from
more than one methodology provides a better understanding of the
integrated nature of household decision-making. This paper therefore
models decision-making of multiple household members across all
household income domains to acknowledge the diversity of household
headship, and incorporates qualitative data to provide further insight.
3. Methodology
3.1. Location details
This study used mixed methods and collected quantitative (ex-
tensive household surveys) and qualitative (follow on interviews in
focus groups) data from households in six irrigation schemes (two each
in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Tanzania). These households are part of
a project, funded by the Australian Centre for International Agricultural
Research, to increase irrigation water productivity and profitability.
The selection of countries followed a scoping study of nine African
countries and considered local expertise, favourable policies and in-
stitutions, and the potential to increase food production. Schemes were
selected based on institutional capacity, ability to improve agricultural
practices, accessibility, and collaboration with local agencies. The
schemes differ in number of irrigators, irrigated plot size, gender, age of
household heads (HH), and dependence on off-farm work (Table 1).
In Tanzania, males dominate as HHs; whereas, females dominate in
Zimbabwe and there are more non-married/de facto households in
Mozambique. For more details about the schemes and irrigation within
the countries see: Mdemu et al. (2017) for Tanzania; Moyo et al. (2017)
for Zimbabwe; and de Sousa et al. (2017) for Mozambique.
3.2. Household quantitative survey
Households on the six schemes were surveyed in 2014 using a
questionnaire. This was based on: various findings from the literature;
in-depth local knowledge about irrigation and agriculture in the three
countries; and informed by discussions with irrigators, extension offi-
cers, and local leaders. The survey was checked by all research and
government organizations involved (including experienced local lea-
ders, extension officers and irrigators) before it was piloted with around
ten households. The survey was designed to collect a broad range of
quantitative data on household demographics and production, and in-
cluded specific questions on household decision-making. Enumerators
were trained to ensure the questionnaire was administered consistently
through face-to-face interviews with households. In the three smallest
schemes we attempted to survey all households. Whereas, in each of the
three larger schemes, 100 households were purposefully recruited and
stratified on plot location (upstream, middle or downstream) and re-
source endowment. The interviews were of approximately two hours
duration and undertaken with HHs and/or other main decision-makers.
Female participation was encouraged. While a man was frequently the
HH, he was often not available. Consequently, the gender balance
among the respondents was relatively even (59% men). From the per-
spective of analyzing decision-making in farm households with in-
creasingly complex livelihood strategies, this sample was considered
ideal as it included a relatively even number of men and women
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whether they were the HH or not.
The stratification and sampling resulted in a survey of 402 house-
holds across the three countries, covering 478 irrigated plots (255 so-
lely controlled by males; 173 by females) and 301 rain-fed plots (158
solely controlled by males; 119 by females).
The survey’s decision-making questions were with respect to four
production types: irrigated crops, rain-fed crops, cattle and smaller
stock (e.g. sheep, goats, chicken and ducks). For each, farmers had to
answer six decision-making questions (24 in total) on: i) what crops to
grow or animals to raise; ii) implement use; iii) purchase and use of
inputs; iv) work times; v) when and where to sell produce; and vi) use of
farming proceeds. The respondent could choose who made the decision
from a provided list: household head, husband, wife, son, daughter,
parent, grandchild, husband and wife, or other (such as other joint
combinations).
3.3. Focus group qualitative research
Following on from the large-scale quantitative surveys and the
findings from their analysis, we conducted focus groups within the
schemes to gain additional insights on irrigated farm decision-making
and gender dynamics. Two focus groups were conducted within each
scheme in July-September 2016. The aim was to obtain insights on
levels of input into decision-making on the schemes, whether decision-
making involves cooperative or non-cooperative behaviour between
spouses, who makes the final decision, and the importance of household
members’ engagement in income-diversification. One focus group was
with females-only, predominantly from female-headed households, and
one was with women and men from male-headed households (mixed
group). This provided the maximum opportunity to explore the balance
in household decision-making and other factors that influence the de-
cision-making dynamics. The discussions focused on five themes:
community-level; household-level; technology access; water govern-
ance; and irrigation impacts. Researchers noted key points on flip charts
and took verbatim notes of individual statements. The focus groups
used SiNdebele in Zimbabwe; Swahili in Tanzania and Changana in
Mozambique.
3.4. Farm decision variable and regression analysis
The gender balance of decision-making was determined by coding
the responses to the 24 decision questions: (1=female, 0=joint and
1=male). Each of these variables was then rescaled to create a gender
balance decision-making index for each of the four production types,
either: 1) all female (all six decisions made by a female); 2) mainly
female (2 or 3 decisions made by a female); 3) balanced; 4) mainly
male; or 5) all male. Hence, an increase in this index indicates more
male decision-making. Besides reflecting the level of male (or female)
involvement in decision making, this index also allows for a more
nuanced understanding of decision-making dynamics—reflecting whe-
ther decision-making was unitary (either 1 or 5) or collaborative (2–4).
Taking the average of the four production types, we created an overall
index of the gender balance of decision-making. It was not always
possible to identify the gender if the decision-maker was a 'parent',
'grandchildren' or 'others'. These answers accounted for around 5% of
total responses, with the majority of them being 'parent'. To avoid ex-
cluding these observations, we classified them as ‘balanced’.2
Ordered probit regression3 modelled the influences on the gender
balance of decision-making (Equation (1)), namely:
y*= x·β+ ε (1)
The dependent variable y is a latent variable measuring the exact
but unobserved extent of the gender balance of decision-making; x is a
vector of independent variables representing the socio economic and
property characteristics of the households; β a vector of parameters; and
ε an error term. Appendix A provides descriptive statistics.
We observe y= 1 (all female), if -∞ ≤ y* ≤μ1; y= 2 (mainly fe-
male) if μ1≤ y* ≤μ2; y= 3 (balanced) if μ2≤ y* ≤μ3; y=4 (mainly
Table 1
Demographic information for irrigation schemes.
Demographics of scheme Irrigation schemes
Tanzania Zimbabwe Mozambique
Kiwere Magozi Mkoba Silalatshani 25 de Setembro Khanimambo
Number of households overall in schemes 168 578 75 845 38 27
Mean number of household members 6 5.5 5.3 6.7 6.8 6.4
Mean age of HH 46 42 62 56 57 59
Gender in household (% households):
Males 51 54 52 47 53 49
Females 49 46 48 53 47 51
HH gender (% households):
Male 90 87 37 69 68 33
Female 10 13 63 31 32 67
Marital status of HH (% households):
Married/de facto 84 78 46 78 68 44
Other: never married/married but not living with partners/divorced/separated/ widowed 16 22 54 22 32 56
Irrigated area (ha) 195 939 10 442 38 10
Mean irrigated area per household (ha) 0.97 1.17 0.11 0.41 1.10 0.67
Individuals working on-farm (% households)a













Mean number of cattle 1.4 4.2 3.7 5.6 0 1.2
Mean number of children < 6rs in household 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.0 0.9
Average size of male-owned plots (ha) 1.78 1.37 0.62 0.98 0.71 1.06
Average size of female-owned or female-male jointly owned plots (ha) 0.16 0.19 0.70 0.74 1.06 1.47
a An individual can work both on- and off-farm; or work neither on- nor off-farm.
2 An index for each production type was also created. The indexes of these six
aspects are highly correlated and highly correlated with the overall index
(correlation coefficient> 0.84). We therefore report the overall index.
3 Results were obtained using both ordered logit and ordered probit models.
The test results between the two models were very similar; albeit ordered probit
had slightly higher explanatory power, hence, the ordered probit results are
reported here.
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male) if μ3≤ y* ≤μ4; and y= 5 (all male) if μ4≤ y*<+∞, where y is a
rough categorization of y*, μ1, μ2,μ3 and u4 are parameters to be esti-
mated.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression (Equations (2)) modelled
how the decision-making dynamic as well as other factors influence the
six types of household income.
I =w·δ+ ν (2)
Equation (2) was estimated for each income type (I); w is a vector of
independent variables; δ is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ν
is an error term. Pre-testing suggested that income should take a
logarithmic form for a better fit. We tested whether the decision-
making index was endogenous with household income, using the
gender of HH as a valid instrument. For example, it is possible to argue
that differences in household income help drive the gender balance
(based on the literature where higher assets/income owned by females
are associated with greater female decision-making). However, results
suggested that the decision-making index was not endogenous with any
type of household income.4 Again, independent variables are based on
the literature. We also accounted for other potential influences by in-
cluding a dummy for HH being single or widowed, and number of males
in the household.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Overview
Table 2 provides an overview of the gender balance of household
decision-making by country.5 The husband and/or the wife pre-
dominantly make farm decisions, with other household members
making a smaller proportion (ranging from 8% for cattle to 12% for
irrigation). Looking at the overall decision-making across all three
countries, there is a surprisingly even proportion across the decision
categories with only a small skewness toward male-dominated decision-
making (from 16–23%). However, large differences exist amongst the
three countries (Table 2) and the schemes (Appendix B).
In Tanzania, men make most decisions and this probably reflects
social norms. Females make most decisions in Zimbabwe, which
probably reflects that many men work away. However, both countries
report 20% balanced decision-making. Balanced decision-making was
rare in Mozambique, with decisions made mostly by men in one scheme
and mostly by females in the scheme where a large proportion of men
work away in South Africa. In Zimbabwe, female-only decision-making
is likely if the female HH is widowed. Households where females make
all the decisions accounted for 56% of widowed HHs, compared to 18%
amongst other households.
In Mozambique and Zimbabwe, production type clearly influences
the gender balance of decision-making; whereas, all decisions are male-
dominated in Tanzania. Across all schemes, decision-making about
cattle is male-dominated while small stock is female-dominated (except
for Mozambique). These findings are consistent with the literature
(Peters, 1986). Apart from small stock, female decision-making is
highest for irrigation: particularly in Zimbabwe and Mozambique
where the proportion of all-female decision-making is higher than for
any other production and higher than male-only. This is a new finding
not previously reported in the literature.
We analyzed how respondents’ gender was associated with the
ranking of decision-making (Table 3) to assess whether males report
decision-making differently to females. The majority of female re-
spondents (74%) report either female-only or more female decision-
making; whereas male respondents report male dominated or joint. As
many female respondents are de jure HH, we excluded widowed HH and
found that now 62% reported female-only or more female decision-
making. Excluding widowed HH, equal decision-making is almost even
but women still rate female decision-making higher. This probably re-
flects the prevalence of de-facto female HHs in this category, who have
an increased role in decision-making. This is contrary to the findings of
Ellis and Allison (2004) but consistent with Bryceson (2002) and Las-
tarria-Cornhiel (2006). Reflecting this, male HH respondents were more
likely to be spending more time on-farm; hence, were more involved in
decision-making. We further tested the impact of collaborative deci-
sion-making by combining more female, equal and more male into one
category called collaborative (not reported in Table 3).
This analysis suggests that there were no significant differences
between male and female respondents in their rating of collaborative
decision-making. This adds nuance to Booysen et al.’s (2013) urban
findings. In this rural setting, the balance in collaborative decision-
making between a husband and wife depends on the HH’s gender,
which in turn depends on the presence of the male in the household.
4.2. Modelling the influences on the dynamics of decision-making: overall
and production types
Table 4 presents the results of the ordered probit decision-making
regression and Table 5 the OLS income regression.
The regressions have no serious multicollinearity and the use of
robust standard errors mitigated the issue of heteroscedasticity. The
McKelvey & Zavoina R2 for the ordered probit models and R2 for the
OLS models are all satisfactory, indicating overall model fitness.
The ordered probit regression identified a wide range of influences
on the gender balance of decision-making. One of the strongest findings
is the significant difference between the countries (the comparison is
Tanzania). This is both with respect to variations in the overall deci-
sion-making index and the individual production indexes. Across all
decision types (except cattle), females play a significantly greater role
in Zimbabwe than in Tanzania. In Mozambique, females play a sig-
nificantly greater role in overall and rain-fed decision-making, while
they have a significantly lesser role in small livestock decision-making.
Table 2













Overall Tanzania 190 4.2 7.4 21.6 29.5 37.4
Mozambique 33 18.2 39.4 6.1 24.2 12.1
Zimbabwe 168 29.8 29.2 20.2 11.9 8.9
All 391 16.4 19.4 19.7 21.5 23.0
Rain-fed Tanzania 129 4.7 7.0 19.4 27.1 41.9
Mozambique 24 16.7 50.0 0.0 29.2 4.2
Zimbabwe 160 51.9 3.8 19.4 1.3 23.8
All 313 29.7 8.6 17.9 14.1 29.7
Irrigated
crops
Tanzania 181 5.5 5.0 21.0 25.4 43.1
Mozambique 31 32.3 25.8 6.5 9.7 25.8
Zimbabwe 167 58.1 1.8 19.2 1.2 19.8
All 379 30.9 5.3 19.0 13.5 31.4
Cattle Tanzania 39 2.6 0.0 33.3 5.1 59.0
Mozambique 9 0.0 66.7 0.0 11.1 22.2
Zimbabwe 119 26.9 7.6 21.0 10.1 34.5
All 167 19.8 9.0 22.8 8.9 39.5
Small
stock
Tanzania 94 7.2 8.5 22.3 8.5 53.2
Mozambique 4 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 50.0
Zimbabwe 156 51.3 16.7 18.0 3.2 10.9
All 254 34.7 13.4 19.7 5.1 27.2
4 The endogeneity test was implemented after a two stage least squares re-
gression, under the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressor
(gender decision-making index) is exogenous. For each of the household income
models, the null hypothesis could not be rejected at the 0.05 significance level.
5 Results for Zimbabwe and Tanzania are included in Appendix B. Figures for
Mozambique are not disaggregated due to low numbers.
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Where the HH was male, decisions were significantly more likely to
be male-dominated, which is consistent with the finding that in male-
managed farming systems men are completely or mostly controlling
production and decision-making (Doss and Meinzen-Dick, 2015; van
Koppen and Hussain, 2007; Hussain, 2007). Other factors are also sig-
nificant: i) the larger the percentage of farm work carried out by the
HH, the more males dominate rain-fed and cattle decisions; ii) if the HH
is widowed (most likely a female), cattle decisions are less likely to be
male-dominated; and iii) the larger the percentage of males, the more
men dominate small stock decision-making. The last finding was un-
expected and suggests that the more male-dominated the household,
the more men infringe on the traditionally female-dominated area of
small stock (Peters, 1986). This study confirms the link often made in
the literature between decision-making and control over farmland
(Doss et al., 2014). There is a significant and negative relationship
between the total size of land not owned by males-only and the overall
decision-making index. There is a similar relationship between the rain-
fed and irrigated areas not owned by males-only, and the index for rain-
fed and irrigated production. That is, females have a larger role in
decision-making if they formally have full or part control over the land.
The focus group discussions across all schemes repeatedly highlighted
that men predominantly control land and that it was difficult to talk
about the control of land. This supports the finding of Meinzen-Dick
et al. (2011).
4.3. Modelling the influence of the dynamics of the decision-making
environment on income
The dynamics of decision-making influenced income in several ways
(Table 5). Total income was higher if decisions were made more by
females, more by males, or by males-only. The estimated magnitude
was 98%, 86% and 142%, respectively.
Table 3
Decision-making by female and male respondents (by all respondents and with widowed respondents excluded) (%).
Decision-making All respondents Widowed respondents excluded
Female Male Female Male
All female 38 1 28 10
More female 36 7 34 15
Equal 14 24 22 24
More male 6 32 8 25
All male 6 36 9 27
Pearson chi2(4)=196.11 Pr= 0.00 Pearson chi2(4)= 125.68 Pr=0.00
Table 4
Ordered probit modelling of influences on farm decisions (a higher decision index (DI) indicates greater male decision-making).
Independent variables Overall DI Rain-fed DI Irrigated DI Cattle DI Small stock DI
HH male 1.512*** 1.766*** 1.165*** 1.252*** 1.373***
% of males in household 0.554 0.256 0.321 0.714 1.007**
HH age −0.002 0.005 0.002 0.011 −0.003
HH single (dummy) 1 0.208 0.36 0.117 −0.0004 0.356
HH widowed (dummy) 1 0.001 -0.208 −0.356 −1.122*** 0.489
Household size −0.008 0.001 −0.03 0.018 −0.068
% of on-farm work by HH 0.003 0.007** 0.003 0.010*** 0.004
HH education: primary school2 −0.001 −0.182 0.073 −0.277 −0.168
HH education: above primary school2 −0.022 −0.127 −0.013 0.259 0.003
Household members working away 0.043 −0.101* 0.059 0.008 0.145**
At least one household member's health condition is poor (dummy) −0.021 −0.161 0.133 −0.246 0.143
Country: Mozambique3 −0.599* −0.558* 0.28 −0.014 4.566***
Country: Zimbabwe3 −0.586** −0.944*** −0.672** −0.148 −0.836**
Household members < 6 years and Tanzania interaction −0.051 −0.167 0.074 0.197 −0.18
Household members < 6 years and Mozambique interaction 0.404 0.075 −0.126 −0.255 −4.946***
Household members < 6 years and Zimbabwe interaction −0.372* −0.304 −0.128 −0.512* −0.104
Total land area not owned by only male −0.208*** N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Cattle not owned by only male −0.011 N.A. N.A. −0.051 N.A.
Other livestock not owned by only male 0.002 N.A. N.A. −0.022 N.A.
Poultry not owned by only male 0.013** N.A. N.A. 0.01 0.003
Total rain-fed area not owned by only male N.A. −0.290** N.A. N.A. N.A.
Total irrigated area not owned by only male N.A. N.A. −1.083*** N.A. N.A.
μ1 −0.398 0.284 0.107 0.598 0.46
μ2 0.745 0.769 0.406 1.334 1.044
μ3 1.518*** 1.480** 1.134** 2.219*** 1.683**
μ4 2.339*** 2.018*** 1.589*** 2.577*** 1.918***
Observations 357 286 345 148 229
Wald chi2 229*** 159*** 226*** 148*** 594***
McKelvey & Zavoina R2 0.55 0.57 0.52 0.60 0.56
Notes: 1Reference group is HH married at present. 2Compared to the reference group of HH, is below primary school. 3Country reference group is Tanzania. 3***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
N.A.—not applicable; dependent variable is the decision-making index 1=fully female to 5=fully male.
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The literature suggests that de facto female-headed households are
the poorest households as they do not benefit from off-farm incomes
and have fewer assets and human resources (de Sousa et al., 2017;
Safilios-Rothschild, 1985). However, our models did not find significant
differences between widowed and married HHs, or between single and
married HHs. If decisions were made by males-only, on-farm income
was higher than if decisions were made by females-only (estimated
199%). This is probably due to the additional availability of labour.
However, this might also reflect that some absent male HHs make de-
cisions by mobile phone and regularly participate in farm work during
weekends and critical farm periods. Male off-farm work provides sig-
nificant income, allowing for the purchase of inputs and hiring of non-
family labour, as was found in Mozambique (de Sousa et al., 2017).
This potentially allows better links to markets through the house-
hold having a presence in town. If decisions are made more by females
or more by males, off-farm income is estimated at 148% or 204% higher
than if decisions are made by females-only. These two categories of
decision-making reflect that male heads of households work off-farm
but are still involved in farm decision-making. There are no significant
relationships between the decision-making index for the individual
production types and the income from these productions.
As is recognized in the literature (Ellis and Allison, 2004; Manero,
2016), off-farm work is very important for household well-being; both
for supporting farm production by financing farm inputs, but also to
pay for health and education. Reflecting this, we found that the larger
the proportion of farm work carried out by the HH (i.e. the HH is
working less off-farm) the lower the total and off-farm income.
Additionally, we found that irrigation accounts for 65% of farm income
and 42% of household income across the six schemes. Our findings
show clear evidence of the complexity of households’ livelihood stra-
tegies and the importance of the dynamics of decision-making on total,
on-farm and off-farm income. This suggests that when households al-
locate their labour resources they make trade-offs between the dryland,
irrigation and livestock components of their farm and their off-farm
activities. That is, they focus on maximizing their overall return rather
than the return from individual livelihood strategies.
Table 5
OLS modelling of irrigation households’ various forms of income.
Independent variables Total income Farm income Off-farm income Rain-fed income Irrigation income Livestock income
Overall decision-index (DI) (more female)1 0.683** 0.356 0.908* N.A. N.A. N.A.
Overall decision-index (balanced) 1 0.336 0.423 0.37 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Overall decision-index (more male) 1 0.634* 0.261 1.113** N.A. N.A. N.A.
Overall decision-index (all male) 1 0.885*** 1.095** 0.66 N.A. N.A. N.A.
DI (more female) rain-fed/irrigation/livestock1 N.A. N.A. N.A. −0.749 −0.439 0.104
DI (balanced) rain-fed/irrigation/livestock1 N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.528 0.311 0.344
DI (more male) rain-fed/irrigation/livestock 1 N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.28 0.012 -0.56
DI (all male) rain-fed/irrigation/livestock1 N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.683 0.228 −0.152
% of males in household −0.927* −1.096 −0.954 −0.212 −1.06 0.265
HH age −0.015* −0.001 −0.018 −0.008 −0.022* 0.025*
HH single (dummy) 2 0.069 −0.102 −0.088 −0.557 0.224 0.72
HH widowed (dummy) 2 0.01 0.017 0.419 0.137 −0.092 0.007
Household size 0.102 −0.119 0.183** −0.062 −0.013 −0.025
On-farm work by HH (%) −0.007** −0.006 −0.013** 0.002 −0.006 −0.006
Household education: primary school3 −0.112 −0.421 −0.085 −0.367 −0.695** 0.596
Household education: above primary3 −0.171 −0.682 0.224 −0.62 −0.876* 0.688
Number of household members working away −0.07 −0.02 0.018 −0.156 0.055 0.091
At least one member’s health condition is poor −0.183 0.506 −0.302 0.766* 0.546 −0.3
Number of household members < 18 years −0.101 0.097 −0.084 0.103 0.029 0.012
Country: Mozambique4 0.035 −0.198 1.208 −1.885* 0.557 −0.129
Country: Zimbabwe4 0.404 −2.046*** 1.896*** −3.608*** −2.025*** −1.935**
Rain-fed area 0.132 0.482*** N.A. 0.736*** N.A. N.A.
Irrigated area 0.372*** 0.537*** N.A. N.A. 0.697*** N.A.
Uncultivated land area −0.390*** -0.204 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Cattle 0.014*** 0.017* N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.049***
Other livestock 0.008* 0.009 N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.029***
Poultry 0.008 0.014** N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.006
Land-maize (%) −0.005 −0.013 N.A. 0.005 −0.007 N.A.
Land-sorghum (%) −0.008 0.001 N.A. 0.027* −0.003 N.A.
Land-groundnut (%) −0.011 −0.02 N.A. 0.012 −0.012 N.A.
Land-tomato (%) −0.001 −0.004 N.A. −0.02 0.008 N.A.
Land-rice (%) 0.002 −0.001 N.A. −0.015 0.006 N.A.
Land-onion (%) 0.132*** 0.087 N.A. 0.134** 0.117* N.A.
Generator 0.15 0.884* −0.689 0.136 1.060* 0.6
Car/motorbike 0.278 −0.182 1.137*** −0.389 −0.121 0.531
Phone 0.338 0.174 0.646 0.027 0.376 0.236
Borehole/water pump 0.757*** 0.186 0.719* 0.098 0.473 -0.275
Farm tools 0.002 0.433 −0.321 0.08 0.266 0.802
Constant 6.953*** 7.101*** 3.765*** 3.958** 6.812*** 0.379
Observations 357 357 357 286 345 251
F-stat 6.96*** 7.92*** 4.05*** 7.14*** 10.39*** 5.70***
R2 0.266 0.374 0.175 0.313 0.386 0.252
Notes: 1Reference group is all female decision-making. 2Reference group is HH married at present. 3 HH education reference group is below primary school. 4 Country
reference group is Tanzania. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 N.A.—not applicable.
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Total income is lower when there is a larger proportion of males in
the household, which at first sounds counterintuitive. This probably
reflects that in a household with a high proportion of males there are
more children attending school: traditionally, rural households prior-
itize the education of male children. This leaves less time for on-or off-
farm work by male children. Male children are also less productive
around the house as they neither fetch water nor look after younger
siblings, but still require care; thereby reducing women’s time for farm
work.
There are also significant country differences in income. For all
production types and compared to Tanzania: in Zimbabwe, farm in-
come was lower while off-farm income was higher, and rain-fed income
was significantly lower in Mozambique. The influence of ownership of
productive resources was as expected: i) the larger the rain-fed area the
higher the total farm and rain-fed income; ii) the larger the irrigated
area the higher the total, farm and irrigation incomes; iii) the more
cattle the higher total, farm and livestock income; iv) the more ‘other
livestock’ the higher the total and other livestock incomes; v) the more
poultry the higher the farm income; vi) having a borehole/water pump
was associated with higher total income; vii) having a generator was
associated with higher farm and irrigated crop incomes; and viii)
having a car/motorbike or borehole/water pump was associated with
higher off-farm income.
Points six, seven and eight suggest resource ownership increases
income, which allows the household to acquire more assets and in-
creases the ability to earn money. The use of motorbikes as taxis is
widespread, especially in Tanzania. A household’s borehole or water
pump significantly reduces the time spent fetching water. This increases
time available for fieldwork; facilitates more irrigated crop production
at the house plot; and enables more time for off-farm activities.
4.4. Focus group findings
In Zimbabwe, both female-only and mixed focus groups report that
decision-making about the use of water and money was joint. However,
in both schemes the female-only focus group reported that sometimes
men overruled women and spent money for their own pleasure (beer or
cigarettes). Also, that most household arguments were over how to
spend scarce resources. Some women said that women made most de-
cisions in the households where the men were absent, and as long as the
work was completed there was no interference from men.
Despite the quantitative findings of predominantly male decision-
making, it was the Tanzanian women who spoke most and appeared
more confident during visits and in focus groups. This might suggest
that women in male-dominated households are active in decision-
making and are more interested in having substantial input and con-
sensus rather than reporting whether a decision is joint (Doss et al.,
2014). We cannot answer definitely, but it is interesting to posit whe-
ther women are under-reporting their decision-making involvement
(Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2006) potentially to support consensus and/or be-
cause they are confident of their influence.
The discussions suggested that joint decision-making was most
common for irrigation management and farm work. However, men
were mainly responsible for finding markets as found by Njuki et al.
(2014). Men primarily made the decisions about spending money, with
a Tanzanian farmer stating that ‘men dominate in control of income
earned from irrigated crops so as to save money for investing in the next
season’ (male farmer, aged 50, Magozi). Male farmers argued that
‘women have unnecessary expenditures such as buying new clothes and
luxury things which is why they have to control income’ (male farmer,
aged 24, Magozi). Whereas, women argued that they have necessary
expenses (e.g., clothes, cooking tools) and often secretly sell crops to
obtain money. These opinions lend support to the notion that African
households are less likely to pool income (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2006).
Despite this evidence of non-cooperation (in both Tanzania and
Zimbabwe), women reported that the level of domestic conflict had
reduced during the project as income increased and this has improved
marriage and power relations between men and women (female farmer,
aged 40, Kiwere; male farmer, aged 48, Magozi).
In Mozambique, discussions suggested that most farmers are now
women, as men increasingly work in towns or in South Africa. While
some absent men make decisions in de-facto female-headed household,
women make most of the day-to-day decisions. Most women stressed
that they are acting on male advice even though they do most of the
fieldwork, make the day-to-day decisions, and take a separate share of
the profit:
We share the decision about what to produce and how. But most of
the time he is the one leading… when it is time to harvest he is
always present and making the deals, but I am the one keeping the
money and at the end I get a small share and the rest is managed by
him (female farmer, aged 35, Silalatshani).
Another female mentioned:
The women are the ones spending more time in the field, but all the
decisions have already been made at home. The men have more
decision-making power in the household. Since I am the one in the
plot I remain in control of the production, but I cannot say the same
about the land; … it is complicated to talk about the control of the
land (female farmer, aged 79, 25 de Setembro).
While men dominate decision-making, women participate most in
fieldwork, meetings and gathering of farming information. Focus group
discussions also repeatedly touched on the division of work within the
household, and many women mentioned that women have a larger role
in decision-making if the HH works off-farm.
Focus groups and field observations in all three countries, confirm
our quantitative findings that women do most of the farm work, espe-
cially when it comes to irrigation. In Zimbabwe, many mentioned that
women and men grow much the same crops under irrigation. However,
when the project introduced the notion of high-value crops, it was
women that were most active in adopting them: to increase their in-
come to invest in farming, improve food security, nutrition and their
children’s education. This is inconsistent with the literature that in-
dicates women’s existing labour roles may limit their ability to take
advantage of new opportunities (Doss et al., 2014). The uptake of high-
value irrigated crops represents a change of mind-set from subsistence
to commercial farming, with part of the surplus used for education and
food security (Bjornlund et al., 2018). In addition, growing higher value
cash crops should increase women’s bargaining power and their influ-
ence on decision-making (Doss and Meinzen-Dick, 2015).
The discussion around livestock reflects the quantitative findings
and the literature (Peters, 1985). Men mainly look after cattle and
donkeys while women take care of goats and chickens. For example:
Men’s first priority is large livestock like cattle, then consumption …
us women value crop production more than men…. somehow, large
livestock comes last to our priorities, but we also have a saying that
a homestead without chickens shows the absence of a woman (fe-
male farmer, aged over 65, Mkoba).
Women also reported that the introduction of soil moisture mon-
itoring tools had allowed them to significantly reduce their time spent
irrigating (often by more than 50%). This time has reportedly been used
to: tend the home garden and small livestock to improve food security
and household income; increase their yield through more weeding; or
increase their off-farm income activities (e.g. baking buns for sale).
Income diversification empowers women and strengthens their bar-
gaining position. This supports the importance of diversified incomes as
identified by Manero (2016) in Tanzania.
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5. Conclusion
This study explores how household decision-making dynamics in-
fluence household income in six small-scale irrigation schemes in
southern Africa. While many of the traditional norms still prevail,
fundamental changes are emerging as the dynamic of decision-making
changes, due to increased livelihood diversification and the introduc-
tion of high-value crops.
Household income is influenced by how a household allocates their
labour resources (between on-farm and off-farm work) and the gender
balance of decision-making. Female-only decision-making households
had the lowest total and farm income. This probably reflects that de jure
female-headed households without the support of a husband have no
off-farm income and fewer labour resources. Households where men
made all the decisions had the highest total and farm income. However,
households with a higher female than male contribution to decision-
making ran a close second, which probably reflects that these are de
facto female-headed households receiving extra income from off-farm
and with access to extra farm labour during critical farming periods.
In conclusion, our findings clearly support that households’ deci-
sion-making dynamics strongly influence total household income.
Rather than maximizing the income from any individual component of
their livelihood strategy, households make trade-offs between irriga-
tion, dryland and off-farm work and allocate their labour resources to
maximize household income. Hence, resource allocation decisions are
not always made to ensure the maximum benefits from investments in
irrigation infrastructure; and consequently, irrigation will not realise its
potential and anticipated contribution to improving rural livelihoods
and food security. In many African countries, a fundamental paradigm
shift in agricultural land and water policies is needed. As well as
considering net social benefits at the basin-scale, policies need to have a
strong focus on making irrigation profitable so that it becomes a pri-
mary source of income. Farming households will then have confidence
to reallocate resources to this activity. For irrigation schemes to become
profitable, there needs to be a transition from growing staples to
commercial crops so that household income can meet food, health and
educational needs. Policies need to facilitate: basin-level hydrological
and environmental considerations; a consolidation of farming plots into
viable units; security of land tenure; improved market and transport
linkages (so crops meet market demand and attract higher prices); and
access to better agronomic and irrigation information (including a focus
on female-provided education). Nevertheless, transitioning small-scale
irrigation schemes into financially viable units is, and will continue to
be, a challenging and complex process.
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Appendix A. Definition and summary statistics of variables
Variable name Definition Mean Std.
Dev.
Overall decision-index 1=all female, 2=more female, 3=balanced, 4=more male, 5=all male 3.16 1.41
Rain-fed decision-index As above 3.09 1.64
Irrigation decision-index As above 3.11 1.66
Cattle decision-index As above 3.49 1.57
Small stock decision-index As above 2.78 1.64
Total gross income Household’s total income (US$), natural logarithm 6.59 1.71
On-farm gross income Household’s on farm income (US$), natural logarithm 5.33 2.66
Off-farm gross income Household’s off farm income (US$), natural logarithm 4.37 2.76
Rain-fed gross income Household’s income (US$) from rain-fed crops, natural logarithm 2.28 2.80
Irrigation gross income Household’s income (US$) from irrigated crops, natural logarithm 4.42 2.93
Livestock gross income Household’s income (US$) from livestock, natural logarithm 2.01 2.64
Overall decision-index (DI) (more
female)1
1=overall decision index is ‘more female’; 0=otherwise 0.20 0.40
Overall decision index (balanced) 1 1=overall decision index is ‘balanced’; 0=otherwise 0.18 0.39
Overall decision index (more male) 1 1=overall decision index is ‘more male’ 0=otherwise 0.22 0.41
Overall decision index (all male) 1 1=overall decision index is ‘all male’; 0=otherwise 0.24 0.42
DI (more female) for rainfed/
irrigation/
livestock1






DI (balanced) for rain-fed/
irrigation/
livestock1






DI (more male) for rain-fed/
irrigation/
livestock 1






DI (all male) for rainfed/ irrigation/
livestock1






Male HH 1=HH is male; 0=otherwise 0.71 0.45
H. Bjornlund et al. Agricultural Water Management 213 (2019) 135–145
143
% of males in household % of male household members in the household 0.52 0.20
Age of HH HH age (years) 51.7 16.62
Marital status of HH, single2 1=HH is currently single; 0=otherwise 0.09 0.29
Marital status of HH, widowed2 1=HH is widowed; 0=otherwise 0.18 0.38
Household size Number of household members 5.54 2.27
On-farm work of HH HH’s on-farm work time (%) 78.8 29.7
HH: primary school3 1=HH’s education level-primary school; 0=otherwise 0.48 0.50
HH: more than primary school3 1=HH’s education level-more than primary school; 0=otherwise 0.21 0.41
Household members away Number of household members working away from home 1.90 2.10
Poor health 1=at least one household member's health condition is poor; 0=otherwise 0.16 0.37
Mozambique4 1= Mozambique household; 0=otherwise 0.08 0.27
Zimbabwe 4 1=Zimbabwe household; 0=otherwise 0.42 0.49
Total land ownership Total land area (hectares) not solely owned by men 0.51 0.98
Rain-fed ownership Rain-fed area (hectares) not solely owned by men 0.30 0.66
Irrigated land ownership Irrigated land area (hectares) not solely owned by men 0.17 0.33
Cattle ownership Number of cattle not solely owned by men 0.49 1.86
Other livestock ownership Number of other livestock that is not solely owned by men 0.98 3.13
Poultry ownership Number of poultry that is not solely owned by men 5.29 12.9
Young children Tanzania Tanzanian number of household member < 6 years 0.26 0.44
Young children Mozambique Mozambique number of household member < 6 years 0.04 0.19
Young children Zimbabwe Zimbabwe number of household member < 6 years 0.19 0.40
Rain-fed area Total rain-fed area (hectares) 0.73 0.98
Irrigated land area Irrigated land area (hectares) 0.75 0.78
Uncultivated land area Uncultivated land area (hectares) 0.24 0.80
Number of cattle Number cattle 3.57 10.1
Number of other livestock Number other livestock 4.93 12.8
Number of poultry Number poultry 10.4 16.1
Maize Land area-maize (%) 61.8 39.4
Sorghum Land area-sorghum (%) 3.01 11.5
Groundnut Land area-groundnut (%) 2.17 7.52
Tomato Land area-tomato (%) 6.32 18.7
Rice Land area-rice (%) 21.5 37.9
Onion Land area-onion (%) 0.13 1.35
Generator 1=household owns generator; 0=otherwise 0.07 0.26
Car/motorbike 1=household owns a car or motorbike; 0=otherwise 0.15 0.35
Phone 1=household owns a mobile phone; 0=otherwise 0.84 0.37
Borehole/water-pump 1=household owns a borehole or water pump; 0=otherwise 0.15 0.36
Farm tools 1=household owns any animal driven tools, wheel-barrow, or ox/donkey cart;
0=otherwise
0.44 0.50
Note: 1 Reference group is all female decision-making. 2 Reference group is HH married at present. 3HH education reference group is below
primary school. 4Country reference group is Tanzania.
Appendix B. Decision-making index by production type and scheme
Scheme n. All female % More female % Balanced% More male % All male %
Overall Mkoba 68 41.2 30.9 13.2 4.4 10.3
Silalatshani 100 22.0 28.0 25.0 17.0 8.0
Kiwere 93 2.2 6.5 17.2 31.2 43.0
Magozi 97 6.2 8.3 25.8 27.8 32.0
Rain-fed Mkoba 66 65.2 3.0 13.6 0.0 18.2
Silalatshani 94 42.6 4.3 23.4 2.1 27.7
Kiwere 70 2.9 8.6 12.9 27.1 48.6
Magozi 59 6.8 5.1 27.1 27.1 33.9
Irrigated crops Mkoba 68 67.7 1.5 14.7 0.0 16.2
Silalatshani 99 51.5 2.0 22.2 2.0 22.2
Kiwere 89 3.4 4.5 16.9 27.0 48.3
Magozi 92 7.6 5.4 25.0 23.9 38.0
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Cattle Mkoba 42 42.9 11.9 11.9 7.1 26.2
Silalatshani 77 18.2 5.2 26.0 11.7 39.0
Kiwere 23 4.4 0.0 17.4 4.4 73.9
Magozi 16 0.0 0.0 56.3 6.3 37.5
Small stock Mkoba 61 55.7 16.4 13.1 1.6 13.1
Silalatshani 95 48.4 16.8 21.1 4.2 9.5
Kiwere 51 5.9 2.0 21.6 7.8 62.8
Magozi 43 9.3 16.3 23.3 9.3 41.9
Note: The sample sizes for 25 Setembro and Khanimambo schemes were too small (25 and 9 respectively) to include.
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